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We administrate the cognitive reflection test devised by Frederick to a sample of 483 
undergraduates and discriminate the sample to consider selected demographic characteristics. For 
the sake of robustness, we take two extra versions that present cues for removing the automatic 
(but wrong) answers suggested by the test. We find a participant’s gender and religious attitude to 
matter for the test performance on the three versions. Males score significantly higher than females, 
and so do atheists of either gender. While the former result replicates a previous finding that is 
now reasonably well established, the latter is new. The fact that atheists score higher agrees with 
the literature showing that belief is an automatic manifestation of the mind and its default mode. 
Disbelieving seems to require deliberative cognitive ability. Such results are verified by an extra 
sample of 81 participants using Google Docs questionnaires via the Internet. 
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 These days, most cognitive psychologists favor a dual-system approach to higher cognition 
processes [1-2]. Behavioral economics, in turn, can be organized around such a two-system model 
of the mind [3]. The two systems compete for control of our inferences and actions. Intuitive 
decisions require little reflection and use “System 1.” By scanning associative memory, we usually 
base our actions in experiences that worked well in the past. However, whenever we make 
decisions by constructing mental models or simulations of future possibilities, we engage “System 
2.” System 1 is evolutionarily older and we share it with other animals. Actually, it is made up of 
a set of autonomous subsystems. These subsystems include input modules related to specific-
domain knowledge. In turn, System 2 is evolutionarily more recent and distinctively human. It 
allows abstract reasoning and way of thinking using hypotheses. System 2 correlates with general 
intelligence measures, such as IQ. However, it is bounded in terms of working memory capability. 
Decisions based on System 1 are fast and automatic, while those based on System 2 are slow and 
deliberative. Automatic decisions work well most of the time, but they also lead to predictable 
biases and heuristics (which are simple procedures that help find adequate, though often imperfect, 
answers to difficult questions) [3]. The early evolution of System 1 suggests its logic is related to 
an “evolutionary rationality,” while the logic of the lately evolved System 2 refers to the individual 
rationality [4]. Some decisions based on System 1 that seem irrational from an individual 
perspective may have an evolutionary logic from the genome perspective. Here, specific-domain 
reasoning makes more evolutionary sense than general-domain reasoning (System 2), and the 
System 1 mind is modular even when engaged is general-domain reasoning. The late emergence 
of System 2 occurred with little direct genetic control, and this allowed individuals to alternatively 
pursue their own objectives and not exclusively those of their genes [5]. This posits a potential 
conflict between individuals and genes that can possibly be the basis of the human psychology of 
self-deception [6]. 
The evidence for two minds come from experimental psychology, neuroscience, and 
possibly archaeology, too. In experimental tasks, participants who are asked to logically answer 
according to previous protocol mingle their prior beliefs with the logical deduction of the 
conclusion. When experimenters choose syllogisms where the premises conflict with the 
conclusion, a belief-bias effect emerges because participants tend to pick a conclusion if it is 
believable by itself. System 1 is biased to believe and confirm [3], while System 2 struggles to 
overcome (or otherwise leniently endorses) the beliefs suggested by System 1. 
 Another experimental evidence for dual-process reasoning is given by the “matching bias,” 
which occurs when people select cards in “Wason selection tasks.” Wason [7] wondered whether 
ordinary people could be Popperian. Are they equipped to test hypotheses by searching for 
evidence that potentially falsifies them? Participants in Wason selection tasks commonly suggest 
the answer is “no.” People tend to pick matching cards according to their lexical content, regardless 
of their logical content. For this reason, they cannot find violations of descriptive or causal rules. 
The matching bias is a System 1 heuristic. Not surprisingly from an evolutionary standpoint, 
performance in the Wason selection task improves when social contracts are involved [8]. 
 There is neuroscientific evidence that syllogistic reasoning occurs in two different brain 
regions. Using fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) techniques in tasks that elicit the 
belief-bias effect [9], whenever participants make the logically correct decision there is activation 
of the right inferior prefrontal cortex. Incorrect answers biased by belief activate the ventral medial 
prefrontal cortex, which is part of the mammalian brain and implicated in both intuitive answers 
and System 1 heuristics. Moreover, a PET (positron emission tomography) study finds the access 
to deductive logic involves the right ventral medial prefrontal cortex, an area linked to emotions 
[10]. 
 After training participants to overcome the matching bias, those who succeed activated a 
distinct region of the brain. Under the matching bias, all the participants activated a posterior area, 
but those who overcome the bias activated the left prefrontal [11]. Moreover, fMRI shows neural 
differentiation for reasoning with abstract material and reasoning using semantic-rich problems 
[12]. Abstract problems activate the parietal lobe, while content-based reasoning recruits the left 
hemisphere temporal lobe. 
 The archaeological record also suggests humans developed System 2 for the general-
purpose reasoning after the autonomous subsystems (System 1) had already evolved. About 50 
thousand years ago, there was an abrupt emergence of representational art, religious imagery and 
fast adaptations in the design of tools and artifacts [13]. 
 A simple test devised by behavioral economist Shane Frederick [14] assesses how 
individuals differ in their cognitive ability. His cognitive reflection test (CRT) measures the 
relative powers of Systems 1 and 2, that is, the individual ability to think quickly with little 
conscious deliberation (using System 1) and to think in a slower and more reflective way, using 
System 2. High scores on the CRT track how strong System 2 is for one individual. Not 
surprisingly, the CRT is correlated with other measures of cognitive ability, including the 
Wonderlic Personnel Test, the Need For Cognition scale, and self-reported SAT and ACT scores. 
However, the CRT is not just another IQ test. Because it measures the ability or disposition to 
resist reporting the response that first comes to mind (cognitive reflection), it is arguably better 
than the other measures in terms of predicting decision making [14, 15]. It may predict, for 
example, risk and intertemporal preferences [14]. Moreover, high intelligence does not make 
people immune to biases [15]. Intelligent people may still show superficial or lazy thinking, and 
this is related to a flaw in their reflective mind. This fact explains that university students usually 
perform poorly on the CRT. 
 Frederick’s first use of the CRT [14] found that males score significantly higher than 
females. Males are more likely to reflect on their answers and less inclined to go with their intuitive 
responses. Can Frederick’s result be used in waging a war between the sexes? Definitely not. Being 
automatic brings advantages in most daily tasks, although it also exposes us to predictable bias 
and heuristics in some situations. Interestingly, Frederick also found that “being smart makes 
women patient and makes men take more risks.” Although Frederick himself found this result 
“unanticipated and suggesting no obvious explanation,” the result makes sense if one thinks in 
evolutionary terms because picky females and risk-seeking males may have an evolutionary 
advantage. In this study, we replicate Frederick’s finding. Indeed, in our sample males score 
significantly higher on the test than the sample females do. 
 Anything that makes it easier for associative memory to run smoothly will bias beliefs [3]. 
For System 1, understanding is first believing [3]. It is then up to System 2 to adopt or not the 
suggestions of System 1. Believing is our default mode of thinking. Moreover, there is an inborn 
readiness for us to separate physical and intentional causality [16, 17]. System 1 infers goals and 
desires where none exists, making us animists and creationists by default [18]. These two concepts 
of causality were shaped separately by evolutionary forces, and they may explain the ubiquity of 
religious beliefs [18]. They are rooted in System 1. System 1 sees the world of objects as separate 
from the world of minds, thus making it possible for us to envision soulless bodies and bodiless 
souls [18]. One consequence is to believe that an immaterial divinity is the ultimate cause of the 
physical world; another is to believe in the existence of an afterlife. These two characteristics are 
common to all religions [18]. Because being a nonbeliever requires more cognitive effort, it is 
likely that atheists may be endowed with a more vigilant System 2. This inference is confirmed in 
our study, where individuals who declare themselves atheists outperform believers on the CRT. 
 Other demographic characteristics we consider in our study are: age, handedness, 
parenthood, and current emotional state – but these proved to not be related to CRT performance 
in our sample. For a discussion of why these characteristics might matter, see reference [19]. 
 The rest of this report is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data collected through 
questionnaires and the methodology employed. Section 3 shows the results, and Section 4 
concludes the study. 
 
2. Materials and methods 
 
 Initially, a total of 483 undergraduates from the Federal University of Santa Catarina, 
Brazil took part in the study. The students came from five courses in social sciences and social 
work, two courses in mathematics and physics, and one course in education. The experimenters 
(GS and MDC) administered the tests to the participants in classrooms with the consent of teachers. 
After this round of tests was completed, the experimenters sent Google Docs questionnaires via 
the Internet (through email messages) to an additional sample of 81 distinct undergraduates, also 
from the Federal University of Santa Catarina. This aimed at verifying the results found with the 
previous sample. Therefore, in the end, 564 people participated. The questionnaire collected the 
aforementioned demographic variables (gender, age, handedness, parenthood, religiousness, and 
current emotional state) and then applied the CRT. Prior to the test, participants were asked to 
respond its three questions (below) in less than 30 seconds. At the end of the test, one respondent 
was asked whether he or she had really spent less than 30 seconds to answer the three questions. 
There was also a question inquiring whether one respondent already knew one or all of the three 
questions. Although we stated we would remove from the sample those who declared to have taken 
more than 30 seconds or to have known at least one of the questions, no participants reported 
either. 
 The questionnaire asked for each participant’s gender (male or female), age, handedness 
(right-handed or left-handed), whether he or she had children and lived with them, whether he or 
she believed in God, and his or her current emotional state. As for the latter, the questionnaire 
presented a continuous affect scale, ranging from “very anxious” and “moderately anxious” to 
“emotionless,” “moderately excited” and “very excited” [19]. 
 The three simple questions of the cognitive reflection test were conceived to elicit 
automatic responses that are wrong [14]. We call Frederick’s CRT as Version A. 
 
 CRT: Version A 
 
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? 
_____ cents 
 




3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the 
patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? 
_____ days 
 The correct answers are 5, 5 and 47. As for question 1, the intuitive answer that springs 
quickly to mind is “10 cents.” However, this is wrong. The difference between $1.00 and 10 cents 
is only 90 cents, not $1.00 as the problem stipulates. Let x  be the ball cost; then
(1.00 ) 1.10 0.05x x x     . The automatic answer to question 2 is 100. This is wrong because 
taking the first sentence and multiplying the number of machines (5) by 20, it would take the same 
5 minutes to make 100 widgets. In question 3, the intuitive answer is 24. This is also wrong. Let 
the exponential 
nd  represent the function where n  is the number of days it takes the patch to cover 
the entire lake. Thus, half is always 1n , and then the patch will cover half the lake in 48 1 47   
days. When we asked the participants to respond the three questions above in less than 30 seconds 
we aimed to make sure an automatic choice was given. 
Frederick observes that the three questions on the CRT are easy because their solutions are 
easily understood when explained [14]. However, reaching one correct answer requires the 
suppression of an erroneous answer that springs impulsively to mind. In his own study, Frederick 
reports that those who answered “10 cents” to the first question above also estimated that 92 
percent of people would correctly solve it, whereas those who answered “5 cents” estimated that 
62 percent would. In other words, those who performed poorly were also those overconfident. 
 Some participants received two alternative versions of the cognitive reflection test that 
minimally depart from Frederick’s version by making answers explicit. We call such variations as 
Version B and Version C. Our aim in introducing the two new versions of the CRT was to 
investigate whether System 2 is capable of suppressing the automatic drive to provide the wrong 
answers suggested by System 1. 
 
 CRT: Version B 
 
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? 
(  ) 1 cent   (  ) 5 cents   (  ) 10 cents   (  ) 15 cents   (  ) 20 cents 
 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 
widgets? 
(  ) 1 minute   (  ) 5 minutes   (  ) 10 minutes   (  ) 50 minutes   (  ) 100 minutes 
 
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the 
patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? 
(  ) 10 days   (  ) 12 days   (  ) 24 days   (  ) 40 days   (  ) 47 days 
 
 
CRT: Version C 
 
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? 
(  ) 1 cent   (  ) 5 cents   (  ) 15 cents   (  ) 20 cents   (  ) none of the above 
 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 
widgets? 
(  ) 1 minute   (  ) 5 minutes   (  ) 10 minutes   (  ) 50 minutes   (  ) none of the above 
 
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch 
to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? 
(  ) 10 days   (  ) 12 days   (  ) 40 days   (  ) 47 days   (  ) none of the above 
 
Versions B and C aim at making System 2 more vigilant so that it can inhibit, if not 
suppress, the automatic and wrong answers made by System 1. By making the alternatives explicit 
in version B, System 2 is forced to make a comparison between them and thus to possibly become 
more engaged and capable of overriding the wrong answer System 1 is prone to suggest. In version 
C, the intuitive, wrong answers (10, 100, 24) are replaced with “none of the above.” We first 
hypothesized that this would push for further improvement of cognitive reflection, although the 
results shown in Section 3 will find Version C not to convey extra information. The idea of 




 Table 1 shows the number of scores 0, 1, 2 or 3 on the CRT for the 483 participants 
considering the three versions of the test A, B, and C.  In Version A (Frederick’s) most participants 
scored 0 out of 3 (53 percent) and only a minority scored 3 out of 3 (8.6 percent). This replicates 
his results [14] and confirms most participants act automatically and make mistakes using System 
1. 
 
Table 1. CRT scores, by version 
 Percentage scoring 0, 1, 2 or 3 
Version 0 (low) 1 2 3 (high) 
A 53.37 23.93 14.11 8.59 
B 39.52 35.33 13.17 11.98 
C 33.99 28.10 20.26 17.65 
 
 The results for Versions B and C show the cues improved cognitive reflection. The high 
CRT group increases across the three versions from nearly 9 to 12 to 18 percent. The low group 
reduces from 53 to 40 to 34 percent. However, the middle groups show no consistency. This fact 
prompted us to investigate whether Version C really conveys useful information in addition to that 
already existent in Version B. 
 Thus, to assess the level of statistical significance of version differences, we compute the 
p-values from chi-square and likelihood-ratio chi-square tests, which are appropriate for discrete 
responses. Considering the three versions A, B, and C, the responses do depend on the CRT version 
(chi-square p-value = 0.0035; likelihood-ratio chi-square p-value = 0.0040). However, if we 
compute the p-values considering only Versions B and C, we find no statistically significant 
differences (chi-square p-value = 0.1050; likelihood-ratio chi-square p-value = 0.1043). For this 
reason, we merged the sample responses coming from Versions B and C and recalculated the 
percentage scoring. The updated results are displayed in Table 2. Now, Version A and the merged 
Version BC present statistically significant differences (chi-square p-value = 0.0050; likelihood-
ratio chi-square p-value = 0.0048). 
 
Table 2. CRT scores: Version A and the merged Version BC 
 Percentage scoring 0, 1, 2 or 3 
Version 0 (low) 1 2 3 (high) 
A 53.37 23.93 14.11 8.59 
BC 36.88 31.88 16.56 14.69 
 
 Table 3 shows males scored significantly higher than females on the CRT (considering 
Version A). The gender differences are statistically significant (chi-square p-value < 0.0001; 
likelihood-ratio chi-square p-value < 0.0001). Thus, the responses given to the CRT do depend on 
a participant’s gender. This replicates Frederick’s version. The CRT questions have mathematical 
content, and males generally score higher than females on math. However, Frederick [14] shows 
females’ mistakes tend to be of the intuitive variety because males score higher than females on 
the CRT, even controlling for SAT math scores. Moreover, the fact that CRT scores are related to 
gender does not depend in turn on the CRT version considered, either A or BC: chi-square p-value 
= 0.7185; likelihood-ratio chi-square p-value = 0.7185. 
 
Table 3. CRT scores, by gender: Version A 
 Percentage scoring 0, 1, 2 or 3 
Gender 0 (low) 1 2 3 (high) 
Male 32.04 30.10 19.90 17.96 
Female 50.18 28.52 12.64 8.66 
 
 Table 4 shows the main novelty of this work, namely that atheists score significantly higher 
than believers on the CRT. The differences are statistically significant (chi-square p-value = 
0.0227; likelihood-ratio chi-square p-value = 0.0240). Thus, the responses given to the CRT do 
depend on a participant’s religious preferences. The fact that atheists score higher suggests 
believers are the group with stronger System 1. 
 
Table 4. CRT scores, by religiosity: Version A 
 Percentage scoring 0, 1, 2 or 3 
Group 0 (low) 1 2 3 (high) 
Believers 46.31 28.69 14.49 10.51 
Atheists 32.52 30.08 19.51 17.89 
 
 As for the rest of the demographic variables, they show no statistical significance (age: chi-
square p-value = 0.6432; handedness: chi-square p-value = 0.8234; parenthood: chi-square p-value 
= 0.9787; current emotional state: chi-square p-value = 0.1075). 
 Considering the relationship between CRT scores and gender, we adjust the linear 
regression (Table 5): 
 
 CRT scores 0.902 0.431 0.297g q   ,                                                                                             (1) 
 
where g  is a dummy for the gender (male = 1; female = 0), and q  is a dummy for the type of 
questionnaire (Version A = 1; Version BC = 0). Thus, on average males score 43 percent more 
than females and Version BC makes participants score nearly 30 percent more. Therefore, the cues 
help improve performance on the CRT. A low R-square, however, indicates these results hold only 
for averages, and cannot be used to predict individual behavior. 
Using Akaike information criterion for variable selection, religiosity appears as significant, 
but not the other demographic variables. The adjusted linear regression is (Table 6): 
 
 CRT scores 1.125 0.401 0.295 0.290g q r    ,                                                                                 (2) 
 
where r is a dummy for religious attitude (believer = 1; atheist = 0). On average, believers score 
29 percent less then atheists. Regarding the other significant variables (g and q), these do not 
change a great deal in equation (2) relative to their estimation using equation (1). 
 
Table 5. CRT scores, gender, and type of questionnaire 
Analysis of variance 
Source DF Sum of squares Mean square F-value Pr. > F 
Model 2 32.4194 16.2097 15.80 < 0.0001 
Error 480 492.4791 1.0260  
Corrected total 482 524.8985  
 
 Root MSE 1.0129  R-square 0.0618 
Dependent mean 0.9855 Adj. R-sq. 0.0579 
Coeff. var. 102.7812  
 
Parameter estimates 
Variable DF Parameter estimate Standard error t-value Pr. > |t| 
Intercept 
g = 1 
q = 1 
1 0.90199 0.06979 12.92 < 0.0001 
1 0.43117 0.09324 4.62 < 0.0001 
1 -0.29743 0.09752 -3.05 0.0024 
 
 
Table 6. CRT scores, gender, type of questionnaire, and religious attitude 
Analysis of variance 
Source DF Sum of squares Mean square F-value Pr. > F 
Model 3 40.3352 13.4451 13.29 < 0.0001 
Error 479 484.5633 1.0116  
Corrected total 482 524.8986  
 
 Root MSE 1.0058  R-square 0.0768 
Dependent 
mean 
0.9855 Adj. R-sq. 0.0711 
Coeff. var. 102.0582  
 
Parameter estimates 
Variable DF Parameter estimate Standard error t-value Pr. > |t| 
Intercept 
g = 1 
q = 1 
r = 1 
1 1.1251 0.1057 10.65 < 0.0001 
1 0.4015 0.0932 4.31 < 0.0001 
1 -0.2952 0.0968 -3.05 0.0024 
1 -0.2899 0.1036 -2.80 0.0054 
 
 The results using the CRT questionnaires via the Internet do confirm the role of gender and 
religiosity. Table 7 shows the scores using Version A for the smaller sample of 81 distinct 
participants. Here again, males score significantly higher than females (chi-square p-value = 
0.0002; likelihood-ratio chi-square p-value = 0.0001). 
 
Table 7. Version A CRT scores, by gender: confirmatory sample  
 Percentage scoring 0, 1, 2 or 3 
Gender 0 (low) 1 2 3 (high) 
Male 15.79 23.68 26.32 34.21 
Female 53.49 27.91 13.95 4.65 
  Table 8 shows the scores for religious attitude using Version A. As with the larger sample, 
again atheists score higher using this smaller sample (chi-square p-value = 0.0184; likelihood-ratio 
chi-square p-value = 0.0275). 
 
Table 8. Version A CRT scores, by religiosity: confirmatory sample 
 Percentage scoring 0, 1, 2 or 3 
Group 0 (low) 1 2 3 (high) 
Believers 40.32 25.81 22.58 11.29 




Daniel Gilbert [21] once observed: “Findings from a multitude of research literatures 
converge on a single point: People are credulous creatures who find it very easy to believe and 
very difficult to doubt. In fact, believing is so easy, and perhaps so inevitable, that it may be more 
like involuntary comprehension than it is like rational assessment.” And Daniel Kahneman [3] 
added in a follow up: “As the psychologist Daniel Gilbert observed, disbelieving is hard work and 
System 2 is easily tired.” Our findings in this study makes experimental sense of this point of view. 
Indeed, in our study, individuals who declare themselves atheists outperform believers on 
cognitive reflection tests. Believers are more automatic. Our study also confirms the role of gender 
on CRT performance. Males score higher, as previously shown [14]. We also consider other 
demographic characteristics – age, handedness, parenthood, and current emotional state – only to 
find these unrelated to CRT performance. 
Our results are robust to slight changes in the CRT. We consider two other versions of the 
cognitive reflection test that minimally depart from the original formulation by making alternative 
answers explicit. Our aim in introducing these is to investigate whether System 2 is capable of 
suppressing the automatic drive to provide the wrong answers suggested by System 1. We find 
that although responses become less automatic, System 2 is ultimately incapable of dissuading the 
wrong cues. Some tests were administered in classrooms to a sample of 483 undergraduates and 
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